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Abstract. We study private provision of a continuous public good in an incom- 
plete information repeated game. The analysis generates the following pre- 
dictions in the form of Perfect Bayesian equilibria. When the discount factor 
is low, the game played by increasingly optimistic players may collapse into 
a war of attrition: delay may occur and one player may bear the burden of 
providing the public good while the other free rides forever. On the other 
hand, if the discount factor is high, or low but prior beliefs are "pessimistic", 
the inclusion of incomplete information has no impact on the pattern of 
contributions. 
1. Introduction 
The contributor to any public good obtains a direct benefit from the increased 
supply, but defectors with the same valuation as the contributor usually 
reap a higher net benefit. This externality leads to the well-known under- 
provision result obtained in static, noncooperative models. However, the theory 
predicts quite the opposite for the case of recurring contributions: Under 
complete information, McMillan (1979) has shown that the repeated public 
good provision game has equilibria on the payoff possibility frontier. The 
purpose of this paper is to investigate the free-riding problem in a dynamic 
model with incomplete information about valuations, and contrast the re- 
sulting pattern of contributions with the polar predictions mentioned 
above. 
We consider a repeated provision game of a continuous and perishable public 
good. In each stage game the players' welfares depend on total contributions raised 
during the corresponding period. Real world situations involving such public 
goods are, for example, countries sharing a global ecosystem, students sharing 
facilities of a dormitory, partnership games (analyzed by Radner 1986) and the 
interaction of two superpowers in a small country (Schelling 1966, Ch. 2). The 
common features of these situations are the presence of positive externalities and 
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individual actions that are strategic substitutes.1 Whereas equilibria of static games 
display free riding, repeated play of these games generates incentives to cooperate 
and obtain higher payoffs through the possibility of retaliation. The inclusion of 
incomplete information complicates the problem, however. If a pure defection 
advantage exists, a high-valuation player faces a dilemma: by making a contribu- 
tion he reveals his type, hence his threats to defect in the succeeding periods will 
lack credibility. On the other hand, if everyone defects nothing gets done and all 
high-valuation players are worse off. This brings us to central questions addressed 
in this paper: Under what conditions does a pure defection advantage arise? How is 
the pattern of contributions affected by the inclusion of incomplete information in 
a repeated game? 
Three types of inefficiencies are emphasized in the literature on private provis- 
ion of public goods. The first is the well known free-rider problem, mostly observed 
in static contexts? The second inefficiency manifests itself in the form of delayed 
contributions in dynamic settings with incomplete information? A third type of 
inefficiency also arises in dynamic models, generating total contributions even 
lower than predicted by static models. Such an equilibrium outcome involves either 
a small number of contributors or many contributors with very low individual 
contributions (see Fershtman and Nitzan 1991 or Admati and Perry 1991). These 
three types of inefficiencies are all potentially present in our model. The main 
improvement of this paper to the existing literature lies in its rich class of predic- 
tions regarding the link between the initial parameters (i.e., distribution of prior 
beliefs, the types and the discount factor of the players) and the properties of 
potential outcomes (i.e., type of inefficiency, the pattern of contributions, identities 
of the contributors, occurrence of delay before the first contribution). This stems 
from the "nature" of our stage game. For instance, if the stage game has the features 
of a chicken game, its repeated play under incomplete information yields a war of 
attrition, whereas an efficient outcome with high contributions may arise if the 
stage game has the features of a prisoners' dilemma. To gain insight into the 
question of when the provision game generates a specific type of inefficiency (such 
as those observed in a war of attrition), the stage game of the overall game wherein 
the potential contributors' incentives are analyzed must be sufficiently flexible. Our 
model has this property; for some values of the parameters the stage game turns 
1 Individual actions are strategic substitutes if best-reply functions have negative slopes. 
In the context of a public good provision problem, strategic substitutability implies that 
a player's optimal reaction to an increase in other players' contributions is to decrease his 
own contribution. See Fudenberg and Tirole (1984) or Bulow et al. (1985). 
2 See for example Palfrey and Rosenthal (1984, 1988), Bergstrom et al. (1986) and Andreoni 
(1988) for recent treatments of the classical free-rider problem in static contexts. 
3 The analysis of this outcome is closely related to the war of attrition games (see, e.g., 
Nalebuff and Riley (1985) and Fudenberg and Tirole (1986), bargaining under incomplete 
information (Chatterjee and Samuelson 1987) and reputation (Kreps and Wilson 1982). The 
first paper to introduce dynamics and delay in a public good provision context is Bliss and 
Nalebuff (1984) but their analysis is limited to a discrete public good and the game 
terminates at the provision date. Gradstein (1992) has extended their model to two periods 
with accumulating contributions. In his model, individual contributions and provision 
costs are fixed but costs vary across individuals. This paper is most closely linked to the last 
two papers mentioned above. Significant differences between these models and ours are 
presented in Section 2. 
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into a chicken game, for some others, into a prisoners' dilemma. As expected, total 
contributions under these two types of stage games evolve quite differently. 
The results and the contents of the paper are summarized below. We present in 
Section 2 a two-player repeated game with two potential types for each player. 
While the low-valuation player never contributes to the public good, the high- 
valuation type may contribute unilaterally. One of the factors on which the pattern 
of contributions in the overall game depends is the expected outcome of the 
potential subgame played under complete information. Here we make the standard 
assumption that in this subgame the high-valuation types play a "focal equilib- 
rium" with symmetric and efficient payoffs subject to the subgame-perfection 
constraint. These payoffs, hence the Perfect Bayesian equilibrium of the overall 
game, depend on the discount factor. In Section 4 we characterize these equilibria 
and show that for discount factors not too low, the inclusion of incomplete 
information is inconsequential to the pattern of contributions. This result is in the 
spirit of the folk theorem and highlights the conditions under which two high- 
valuation players will provide the public good cooperatively forever no matter their 
beliefs at the outset of the game. 
Another potential outcome of the overall game is a war of attrition. In Section 
4 we show that the necessary condition for this outcome is a low discount factor. 
However, a low discount factor is not sufficient; If the players put much weight on 
their actual welfares or if they think that the situation will not recur any more, then 
the outcome depends critically on the distribution of prior beliefs. For instance, the 
war of attrition is avoided if all players are pessimistic, i.e., if each thinks he is the 
only player with a high valuation. Otherwise the inclusion of incomplete informa- 
tion leads to a war of attrition where the outcome may exhibit all three types of 
inefficiencies mentioned earlier. In a war of attrition, strategies are mixed at the 
initial stages, hence convey type-information and one player (or both) may reveal 
his type in any period, converting the overall game into an asymmetric (or 
complete) information game. We show that more optimistic prior beliefs can actually 
intensify the players' incentives to free ride even in a repeated game setting. If prior 
beliefs are asymmetric and the discount factor is low, the war of attrition is resolved 
immediately: With probability one, the pessimistic player starts contributing and 
bears the burden of providing the public good while the other player free rides 
forever. 
Section 5 concludes. 
2. The model 
This section presents a two-player, infinite horizon repeated game of private 
provision of a continuous public good, Q. We consider two basic types of players. 
A type-L player never participates. The other type, called type-H, has a sufficiently 
high valuation so that he may participate. Denoting by C(Q) and U(Q) respectively 
the per-period provision cost and the utility function of a type-H player, we assume 
the following: 
(A1) U (Q ) is strictly concave, increasing and C (Q ) is strictly convex and increas- 
ing. Furthermore, U(O) = C(O) = 0 and lim U'(Q) > lim C'(Q) > O. 
Q~o Q~o 
According to (A1), there is a range of Q in which the marginal utility of the type-H 
player exceeds his marginal cost. This simple structure can be deduced from a more 
elaborate model including private goods. The opportunity cost of providing the 
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public good would then be measured in terms of the private good. The two players, 
A and B, have the same discount factor, 0 < 6 < 1. It is common knowledge that 
player i is of type H with probability ni but types are privately known. 
We decompose the action sets of the players in the stage game into two 
sequential moves (see Fig. 1): First, they decide simultaneously on whether to 
contribute (participation strategy). Next, the players who have decided to contrib- 
ute determine the size of their contributions (contribution strategy). The stage game 
can accordingly be decomposed into one participation game and one contribution 
game. The outcomes of both participation and contribution games are assumed to 
be observable. 4 At the end of each period, total contributions are consumed and 
the game proceeds to the next period. Since type-Ls never contribute anything, 
a participation with a positive contribution is a clear-cut signal that the contribu- 
tor is of type-H. For  i = A, B, the range of a mixed participation strategy Pi is [0, 1], 
and the realization of p~ is denoted ~i. If a player participates (~i = 1), his 
contribution strategy Qi may take any value in R +. Clearly, t~i = 0 implies Qi = 0. 
Since participation precedes contribution, the domain of Q~ consists of possible 
realizations of the participation strategy. 
Let us now compare the features of the game presented above with those of the 
two most closely linked papers, Bliss and Nalebuff (1984) and Gradstein (1992). 
First, the stage game in this paper is repeated ad infinitum whereas the provision 
game of Bliss and Nalebuff terminates at the provision date if and only if at least 
one player makes a contribution. Gradstein extends their model to two periods by 
assuming accumulating total contributions. In both papers, each individual has 
a fixed cost of contributing a fixed amount, thus faces a simple binary decision 
problem. Second, these are models of discrete, durable public goods, not of 
* The decomposition of the stage game, hence of the strategies of the players, is technically 
useful because dealing with randomizations over a binary choice set when players hesitate 
between participation and defection is much easier than studying randomizations over 
a continuum of contribution strategies. Furthermore, as explained below, the decision to 
participate (i.e., choosing a positive contribution) is a crucial factor affecting the evolution of 
the game because it reveals the contributor's type. Treating participation strategies sepa- 
rately highlights this leakage of information. 
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continuous and perishable public goods as considered here. s Third, some features 
of the models in these two papers stem from the authors' interest in the asymptotic 
properties of contribution equilibria, as population size approaches infinity. The 
model in the present paper takes as given the population size and focuses on 
recurrent interactions. 
We now present formal definitions of the equilibrium concept and strategies in 
At At the overall game. Let s t = ({PA, Q~}; {p~, Q~)) be the actions in period t. A history 
of the play at period t is defined by h t = (0t 1, Ot 2, . . . ,  0t t -  1). A mixed participation 
strategy for player i in the overall game is a sequence of maps p~, one for each 
period t, from possible histories h t into [-0, 1]. Similarly, a contribution strategy for 
the overall game maps h t × [0 ,  1] 2 into R +, for each t. Since these strategies may 
convey type-related information, at the beginning of each period the players use 
their opponent's previous participation strategies to update their beliefs according 
to Bayes' rule in the obvious way. Player i's belief that Player - i is of type-H in 
period t is a function nt_i • {t} ~ [0, 1] such that, given n% l, p[-t-1 and p t £ ~ l  
~ t _  i 
1 if t3~ = 1 for any s < t; 
i f f i £~=O for all s < t .  nt_.-],(l _ pt...-],) + (i - ,t.-],) 
Beliefs are thus required to be consistent with strategies and satisfy the "never 
dissuaded once convinced" condition. Note that in the period in which the other 
player contributes, n_ i is updated to (and will remain equal to) one. If, on the other 
hand, no contribution is observed, a slightly complex rule is used along the 
equilibrium path. Mixed participation strategies (not their realizations) appear in 
this updating rule; rational players are able to predict accurately their opponents' 
strategies along the equilibrium path. 
Let WJ and Wd denote respectively A's and B's expected discounted payoffs 
as viewed from period t. We require the strategies in the overall game to form a 
Perfect Bayesian equilibrium (PBE), defined below: 
A Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium is a pair of strategy sequences {p]*, Q~*} and 
{p~*, Q~*} of type-H players such that, for all t, given the history h' and consistent 
beliefs {n~} and {n~}, 
t t* t* W j ( { p a , Q A } ,  {p~*,Q~*}) > WJ({p~, Q]}, {p~*,Q~*}) for all {pta, Qta } (1) 
t t* t* {p;, QI;}) -> wd({pZ " Qa}, {p~, Q~}) for all {p~, Q~}. (2) 
5 Bliss and Nalebuff's model is mainly aimed at explaining delay in contributions. Although 
their model is dynamic, it ignores the implication of providing the public good by assuming 
away the possibility that the same players may face again the same situation. Clearly, the 
player who has provided the public good in the first round will provide it in the second 
round as well. If so, what happens to the outcome of the first round? Gradstein's extension 
provides a partial answer to this question in a model that combines Bliss and Nalebuff's 
paper with Fershtman and Nitzan (1991): Players are more reluctant to participate in the 
two-period case than in the one-period case. We show that this prediction may change 
dramatically when the game is repeated ad infinitum; the inclusion of incomplete informa- 
tion may not produce further inefficiencies in the supply of public goods. 
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The PBE concept basically requires that the strategies be sequentially rational 
(optimal given beliefs and the history of the game) and that beliefs be updated 
according to Bayes' rule whenever possible. 
3. Analysis of the potential subgames 
We focus in this section on the stage game and some special subgames of the overall 
game, and study their equilibria. The results will be used later in Section 4. The 
subgames considered here have special information structures which correspond to 
rc~ e {0, 1}, that is, complete information about types. Since the case of two type-L 
players (~  = 0) is uninteresting, we consider the remaining three combinations of 
prior beliefs and analyze the corresponding repeated game (or any of its subgames). 
When it is common knowledge that one player is of type-H while the other is of 
type-L, the game has a trivial solution: The type-H player produces the public good 
forever with unilateral contributions QHL= argmaxQ{U(Q) -  C(Q)}, which is 
unique by (A1). The overall game has subgames in which the equilibrium outcome 
exhibits perpetual unilateral contributions; these subgames are called the CN-game 
or the NC-game (C for contributing, N for not contributing), depending on whether 
it is player A or B who unilaterally provides the public good forever. Finally, the 
overall game played by two type-H players under complete information (rc~ = 1), 
or any subgame of the overall game having this information structure is called the 
CC-game. We will analyze this game below in some detail. 
Suppose, then, that rc i = 1 is common knowledge. Player i's objective in the 
static stage game is 
max [p,{EpjU(Q, + Q;) + (1 - pj)U(Q,)] - C(Q,)} + (1 - p,)pjU(Qj)]. (3) 
{.i, Q~} 
Since, ex-ante, player j's strategies are unknown to player i, pj can be interpreted as 
the probability thatj  will participate. By (A 1) individual contributions are strategic 
substitutes, i.e., dO.*/d•.* ,. ,, ~j < 0: the optimal contribution of player i decreases as 
playerj increases his contribution. Because the stage game is strongly symmetric, it 
has a unique symmetric Nash equilibrium in which each player participates and 
contributes Qnn = argrnaxo " {U(Q + Qnn) _ C(Q)}. The low payoffs correspond- 
ing to symmetric contributions Qnn, denoted P in Fig. 2, represent the first type of 
P,, 
Payoff Possibility 
I U(Q "~ 1 
P 
I 
0 p U(Q "L ) P(8) v PB 
Fig. 2 
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inefficiency observed in static settings. As a reference point, it is useful to determine 
the efficient supply of public good with symmetric contributions, denoted QP. 
These solve the following problem: 
max [2U(Q1 + Q2) - C(Q1) - C(Q2)]. 
From the corresponding first-order condition 2U'(2Q F) = C'(QF), it follows that 
QF > QHH. We denote by/~ the symmetric payoff U(2Q F) - C(QF). Thus the lower 
and upper bounds of feasible symmetric total payoffs for the static stage game are 
respectively 2_P and 2/~. 
We consider now the CC-game, the infinitely repeated stage game under 
complete information. This game has subgame perfect equilibria (SPE) in which 
type-H players reach higher payoffs via the penalty of Nash reversion. From the 
well-known perfect folk theorem, any individually rational and feasible average 
payoff (up to the first-best) can be supported by SPE strategies provided that 6 is 
sufficiently high. Here this first-best outcome corresponds to total payoffs as large 
as 2/~. 
There is no agreed-upon way of choosing from the set of SPE of the CC-game; 
most authors focus exclusively on an efficient equilibrium, usually a symmetric one, 
yet some versions of the "renegotiation proofness" concept used by a number of 
authors imply that the equilibrium must be inefficient. Here we adopt the former 
approach widely used (implicitly or explicitly) in the literature. Denoting by 
{P(6), P(6)} the highest symmetric pair of payoffs that can be supported as a SPE 
outcome given the discount factor, we thus make the following assumption: 
(A2) The players in the CC-9ame play their symmetric and most efficient SPE 
strategies and attain the payoffs P(6). 
That is, each player in the CC-game contributes (~(tS) maximizing the dis- 
counted payoff [U(2Q) - C(Q)]/(1 - ~) subject to 
/~(6) = (1 - 6)[U(Q*(Q) + 4(6)) - C(Q*(Q))] + 6P. (4) 
(4) is called the subgame-perfection constraint, where Q*(Q) is the static best reply 
to 4(6). 6 A deviation to the best static reply yields in the actual period the payoff 
U(Q*(Q) + Q(6)) - C(Q*(Q)), however the path of contributions then reverts to 
the static Nash equilibrium where individual payoffs are P. The maximum symmet- 
ric payoffpair is a point on the payoffpossibility frontier (see Fig. 2), which shrinks 
as 6 decreases. If (4) holds, no player will deviate from the per-period contribution 
Q(6), hence each player will obtain the per-period payoff P(6). A first implication of 
(A2) on the equilibria of the overall game is stated below. 
Proposition 1. I f  P >_ U(QHL), the incomplete information overall game switches 
immediately to the CC-game for any priors and discount factor. 
6 The argument in favor of the players' being attracted by the "focal point" described in (A2) 
is the "equal-sharing principle", a very influential force in social contexts as the public good 
provision game analyzed here. Also, the payoff functions of two type-H players are perfectly 
symmetric. Furthermore, among the symmetric equilibria, all players would prefer the one 
with highest attainable payoff_O(6), given the discount factor that sustains this outcome as 
a SPE. There is strong evidence for the power of focal points in determining outcomes, even 
in isolated bargaining experiments where forces favoring self-interested behavior are the 
most effective. See Roth (1987) for a review of experiments that illustrate this phenomenon. 
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Proof P is the lowest attainable symmetric SPE payoff in the CC-game, while 
U(QHL)-is the payoff corresponding to a pure defection strategy when the other 
player makes his optimal unilateral contribution QnL. Thus if P__ > U(QnL), there is 
no incentive to conceal type-information; both players participate in the first 
period to reap higher payoffs of the CC-game. Q.E.D. 
In addition to (A1) and (A2), throughout the rest of the paper we assume: 
(A3) £ < U(Q~L). 
That is, the condition in Proposition 1 does not hold. The case represented 
in Fig. 2 corresponds to (A3). The stage game then becomes a chicken game: the 
Nash mutual participation payoff P is better than mutual defection, but each 
player's most preferred outcome is that he defects while the other player contrib- 
utes. As we show in Section 4, (A3) is also necessary but not sufficient for 
a free-riding advantage to arise from the information problem alone. 
The last  subgame we consider is the CN-game where B is the informed player 
(corresponding prior beliefs are rc~ = 1 and rt~ e [0, 1)). This game has a unique 
undominated PBE: If the discount factor is sufficiently high so that P(6) > U(QHC), 
then the CN-game collapses immediately to the CC-game. Otherwise, if 
P(6) < U(QHL), the informed player prefers concealing his unverifiable type and 
chooses a perpetual defection strategy. ? The uninformed player's threat "I will stop 
contributing if you (the informed player) do not contribute as well" is empty, 
because there is a probability (however small) that the informed player is of type-L. 
Hence under these conditions the uninformed player is bound to provide the public 
good forever. 
4. Equilibria of the overall game 
Since the discount factor is an important determinant of equilibrium contribution 
patterns, we provide below its possible interpretations before proceeding with the 
formal analysis. The variable 6 is usually thought of as representing pure time 
preference, that is, ~ = e -r~ where A is the length of each period and r is the rate of 
time preference. 6 decreases as r and/or A increases. A higher length of period 
would mean a lower frequency of interaction between players. Another possible 
interpretation of 6 is the probability of continuing from one period to the next, or 
the probability that the same public good provision problem will manifest itself 
again. 
Consider now the outset of the overall game with prior beliefs rt~ and rt~. The 
first step of the analysis is to determine the conditions under which incomplete 
valuation information generates a pure defection advantage. We start with the 
following proposition: 
Proposition 2. The strategy configuration {Pa} = {P~} = {0, 0 , . . .  } is not a PBE of 
the overall game played by type-H players. 
That is, mutual perpetual defection through pure strategies is not an equilib- 
rium outcome if at least one player is of type H. The proof is straightforward and is 
? The CN- and NC-game are special potential subgames of the overall game, whose 
equilibria are characterized in Proposition 3. The proof of Proposition 3 can thus easily be 
adapted to the PBE of the CN- or NC-game. 
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omitted. Discounted payoffs of a type-H player associated with these strategies are 
zero, thus by (A1) a deviation in any period enhances welfare. As we show in 
Proposition 4 below, the overall game must eventually reach one of the three 
potential subgames among which the CN and NC-game exhibit perpetual unilat- 
eral defections. Now, the expected discounted payoffs of A and B can respectively 
be written as: 8 
W 1 , LPnn, eva + (I p~rt~)W cr~] + (1 p~). 1 ,.-.NC = -- - LpBn~ w~i 
+ (i -- p ~ ) r W ~ ] ,  (5) 
[pA' I I ,  A r l  B -{- ( i  - -  p ~ n ~ ) W ~  c ]  + ( I  - -  p.) i  [p.4nxW;' i cN 
+ (1 - p~r~)rW~]. (6) 
In (5), the squared bracket following pa ~ represents player A's expected dis- 
counted payoff from participating, and the one following (1 - p~), from defecting 
in period one. In the superscripts of Wa, combinations of C and N denote player 
A's expected discounted payofffrom the three potential subgames CC, CN and NC. 
For instance, if the outcome of the participation game in period one is ~ = 1 for 
i = A, B, then the game collapses into the complete information CC-game where 
average (per-period) payoffs are _P(6). Thus 
w£c= w c= 
1 - f i  
denotes the discounted payoffs if both players supply the public good immediately 
in period one. This is a random event when mixed participation strategies are used 
(we have omitted the arguments of the strategies for conciseness). The probability 
of switching to the CC-game is x ~ PAPB% from the perspective of A, and 1 1 pBpATL4 from 
the perspective of B. If A participates and observes no participation from B, the 
game collapses into the CN-game where B defects indefinitely. Then, A's dis- 
counted payoffs are: 
WA TM = [U(Q nL) - C(QrtL)] 
1- -6  
Analogously, the outcome in which A becomes the free rider yields 
wNC= U(Q nL) 
1 - 6  
By symmetry, wCN= W~ c and wffC= W cN. Note that revealing a high 
valuation after the other player has done so is dominated by joint switching to the 
CC-game in the previous period, because the latter strategy configuration avoids 
discounting. Finally, if no contribution occurs the game proceeds one period 
ahead. A's expected discounted payoffs are 6Wa 2 and B's are 6W z .  We can now 
proceed to characterize the PBE of the overall game, starting with equilibria in 
pure participation strategies. Let us define 6c, a critical value of the discount 
factor by 
P(rc) = U(Qne). 
s Because the strategy of the type L is known, we need only present the strategies and payoffs 
of the type H when defining and analyzing equilibria. This, of course, does not imply that the 
players in the game are known to be of type H. 
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The highest symmetric payoff that can be supported as a SPE outcome in the 
CC-game is just equal to the pure defection payoff U(Q HL) if 8 = 8c. (A3) ensures 
the existence of 8c s (0, 1). 
Proposition 3: (i) Assume (~ > fie. Play in the overall game switches immediately 
to the CC-game where the PBE strategies are:  { p * l } = { 1 , 1 , 1 , . . . } ,  
{Q~*} - {(~(~), (~(8), ... } and beliefs form the sequence {rc~} = {~ ,  1, 1, ...~ for 
i = A, 1~. Out-@equilibrium-path behavior is as follows: I f  player i deviates to Pi = 0 
in period one, player j contributes the best reply QHL until Pi = 1 is observed. I f  
a deviation occurs in period t > 2, then the static equilibrium with contributions QHH 
iS played forever. 
(ii) Assume 6 < ~.  There is a critical region of prior beliefs defined by the 
function ft :[0, 8c] -+ [0, 1], such that, if r~¢ <_ f~(8), the equilibrium is as described in 
1 then the following strategies case (i) above. On the other hand, if rcli <_ ~(8) < rtj, 
constitute the unique PBE: 
Player/ :  {p*l} = (Q;*} = {0}0, ,.. }, QHL, ... 
Player j: ,1 } {1,1 . . . .  }, 
with corresponding belief sequences given by {r~i} = {rt~,~, ...} and {rc~} = 
{ ~ ,  1, 1 . . . .  }. Player j '  s deviations are ignored, whereas player i' s deviation to p = 1 
in any period leads immediately to the CC-game whose equilibrium is described in 
case 0). There exists no PBE in pure participation strategies exists if ~¢ > ft(8) for 
i = A ,  B. 
Proof. See the Appendix. 
Thus, the CC-game is reached immediately with probability one in the follow- 
ing two cases. (i) The discount factor is high (8 > 8~), (ii) the discount factor is low 
(~ < 8~) but both prior beliefs do not exceed ~(~), a critical level associated with 8. 
In these two cases, the inclusion of incomplete information has no impact on the 
pattern of contributions, hence a low discount factor is necessary but not sufficient 
for a pure defection advantage to arise. Very asymmetric prior beliefs coupled with 
low discount factors may lead to the CN- or NC-game where the pessimistic player 
concedes immediately. Though a perpetual defection is individually the first-best 
outcome, the pessimistic player gives in and contributes QHL forever. This repres- 
ents the third type of inefficiency in the private supply of public goods mentioned in 
the Introduction: Total per-period contributions in the CN or NC-game (QHL) are 
even lower than (2QUH), total contributions in the static play of the complete 
information stage game. If both players are impatient but none is pessimistic in the 
sense described above, another interesting outcome arises. In fact, Proposition 
4 below shows that if future payoffs are heavily discounted, increasing the players' 
optimism intensifies the free-riding problem even in a repeated game setting. 
Proposition 4. Assume ~5 < ~ and ~(r~) <_ rt~ < 1 for i = A, B. There exists a unique 
undominated PBE path, initially in completely mixed participation strateg'es ({ PA }, 
{p~*}), and a finite integer T > 1 such that a contribution occurs at date T with 
probability one. 
Proof See the Appendix. 
The equilibrium outcome of the repeated game may involve delayed contribu- 
tions under the conditions given in Proposition 4. The corresponding equilibrium 
path has the property that the players hesitate between participation and defection; 
they revise their beliefs and put more weight on participation if no contribution has 
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been observed. Eventually these beliefs fall below the critical level ~(6) and a pure 
participation strategy is played. Of course, contributions may start earlier as 
a result of mixing. In each period along this equilibrium path, the expected payoff 
from participation equals the expected payoff from pure defection, given the other 
player's random participation strategy. 
The equilibrium in completely mixed participation strategies is generated by 
the potential pure defection advantage. The gains from a unilateral defection 
are quite attractive but uncertain. Note that the outcome changes dramatically 
if one of the players becomes the informed player; now this player knows the 
gains from defecting forever, which, if P(6)< U(QnL), are larger than those 
he obtains by participating and revealing his type. The overall game then turns 
into the CN- or NC-game where participation strategies are pure, and the 
player identified as type-H has no means to avoid the burden of providing 
the public good. His threat to defect is not credible because the informed 
player's type cannot be verified. Also in the overall game played under two-sided 
incomplete information, unilateral free-riding threats or commitments at the 
beginning of the game are not credible and are eliminated by the PBE 
concept. 
The predictions of the model can be reformulated in light of the interpreta- 
tions of the discount factor mentioned in the beginning of this section. If the players 
are interacting frequently or if the probability that the game ends is low, 
introducing incomplete valuation information has no effect on the pattern of 
contributions. It is only when the length of a period is sufficiently high or the 
frequency of interaction is low that the outcome depends critically on the distribu- 
tion of prior beliefs. 
5. Conclusions 
This paper studies the impact of incomplete information on the pattern of contri- 
butions and incentives to free ride. It shows that contrasting patterns of contribu- 
tions may arise as a function of the discount factor, initial distribution of beliefs and 
the level of expected payoffs in the potential complete information subgame. The 
free-riding problem is not necessarily aggravated by inefficient delays or very low 
contributions as in Bliss and Nalebuff (1984) or Gradstein (1992); the opposite 
happens for a wide range of discount factors. This difference in results stems 
from the differences in assumptions, discussed in Section 2. The two papers 
mentioned above assume fixed contributions and a finite number of periods 
(one and two, respectively), which means that the players will never face a similar 
public good provision problem in the future. This is quite restrictive considering 
the recurrent interaction of individuals in many social settings; it greatly reduces 
the potential for cooperation in the spirit of the chain-store paradox. In a repeated 
game with continuous contributions, we show that if the discount factor is not too 
low, expected payoffs in the potential complete information subgame are suffi- 
ciently high and thus the inclusion of incomplete information has no effect on the 
pattern of contributions. This outcome can also arise when the discount factor is 
low but all players hold pessimistic prior beliefs. Given a low discount factor, the 
overall game may collapse into a war of attrition if players become increasingly 
optimistic. In a war of attrition, the players' reluctance to participate and reveal 
their valuations generates delay with positive probability. The conceding player 
supplies the public good in all future periods whereas the other defects forever. 
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Appendix 
Proof of proposition 3. Notice that any undominated CC-, NC- or CC-outcome that 
occurs through the play of pure participation strategies must occur in period one. 
Hence, ruling out dominated equilibria, delay may occur only through the play of 
mixed strategies. The proofs of cases (i) and (ii) consist of deriving the best reply 
functions and then using these functions to construct the PBE presented in the 
Proposition. 
Case (i). Consider A's best reply to {p~} = {1, 1, ... }. A has two choices in pure 
strategies in the first period: The first is to play p~ = 1. If B too reveals that he is of 
type-H, we are in the CC-game where average symmetric payoffs are/~(6). Second, 
player A can also choose to mimic type-L (p~ = 0) in period one, and then reveal 
his type or not in the second period after observing B's strategy. That is, A can play 
{p]} = {0, 0 . . . .  } if B turns out to be of type-H, and {p]} = {1, 1, ... } otherwise. 
This strategy is the best alternative to the first. Comparing these two pure strategy 
options yields 
x~(P(6)- U(QnL)) + (1 -- x~)(1 -- 6)[U(Q hE) - C(QnL)] > 0 (8) 
which states the condition under which A should prefer the first option, and thus 
{p]} = {1, 1, ... } for i = A, B form a PBE. Clearly, (8) holds no matter the value of 
lt~ if 6 > 6c, which implies the result in case (i) by symmetry. 
Case (ii). Consider now the case 6 < 6c. Since/~(6) - U(Q nL) < 0, the left hand 
side of (8) is decreasing in rc~. Define the schedule ~(~) by the function 
: [0, 6c] ~ I-0, 1], such that (8) holds with equality if gB x = ~(~). Given ~ < 6c, we 
obtain the equilibrium in case (i) if r~ 1 < ~(~). Inspection of (8) reveals that for the 
the strategies described in the prop- case of asymmetric priors, ni x < ~(~) < 7t j ,  
osition are mutually best replies. (8) holds for player j who therefore chooses 
{p)*} = {1, 1, ... } no matter the strategy of player i. Given this strategy of j, the 
The postulated best reply of i is to set {p~*} = {0, 0, ... } because ~(~) < 7tj. 
sequences of beliefs are consistent with the strategies, and no player has any 
incentive to deviate given what happens off the equilibrium path. Finally, the 
non-existence of a pure concession strategy equilibrium if ~(6) < n~ for i = A, B 
can be verified by making use of (8) and Proposition 2. Q.E.D. 
Proof of proposition 4. As stated in Proposition 2, "no contribution ever occurs" is 
not a pure strategy PBE outcome. It is also easy to show that such an outcome 
cannot happen if we allow for mixed strategies. Along any arbitrary pattern of 
mixed strategies, revision of beliefs according to Bayes' rule will generate a declin- 
ing pattern of beliefs, which will eventually fall below the critical level ~(6) and 
a pure participation strategy will be played. Hence, a finite date T exists where 
at least one player contributes. Now assume ~(6) < rc~ < 1 for i = A, B. As men- 
tioned, if the first contribution occurs at date T, at least one player's belief must be 
less than or equal to ~(6). In this proof we consider the case nar < ~(6) < n~ where 
by Proposition 3 (ii) A's optimal strategy in period T is pa r* = 0 and B's is p~* = 1 
(the proofs for the cases n~ < ~(6) < na r and nT < ~(6) use similar arguments.) 
Claim 1. 0 < PT-1. < 1. 
Proof If p.r- 1 = 1, then the public good would be provided at date T -- 1, which 
contradicts our assumption. On the other hand, if pA r -  i = 0, then r~-1  = teaT. 
But since ~ < ~(6), the optimal strategy of B would be p~-1 = 1, leading to 
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a contribution at date T - 1, a contradiction. Therefore, 0 < pa r -  1" < 1. The proof 
of 0 < p r -  1. < I proceeds along the same lines. Q.E.D. 
Claim 2. n r < ~(6) _< na r -  1. 
Proof. 0 < pa r -  1. < 1 implies n~ < n~- 1 through Bayes' rule. Finally, if na r -  ~ < ~(3), 
then pB r -1  = 1, which contradicts Claim 1. Q.E.D. 
At the beginning of period T (before participation strategies are played), the 
players' normalized expected payoffs are respectively given by 
(1 - 3 ) W f  = nTU(Q HL) + (1 -- nr)6pL and (1 - 6)W r = PL, (9) 
where PL = U(Q HL) - C(QnL). Let us now move backwards to period T - 1. By 
Claims 1 and 2 we must have n r -  1 > k(6) holding for both players, which in turn 
implies, by Proposition 3, that the equilibrium strategies in period T - 1 cannot be 
pure. We construct an equilibrium in completely mixed participation strategies 
below. The normalized expected payoffs in period T -  1 associated with pure 
participation and pure defection strategies are respectively as follows: Playing 
p r - 1  = 1 yields 
gar-  lpT-110(~)  + (1 --  gT-1A pAT-"P)  L, (10) 
while p r - 1  = 0 yields 
T-1 _T-1  gA PA U(Q HL) + (1 -- rc At-1 PAT-a)JPL, (11) 
T* T* given the optimal strategies PA = 0 and P8 = 1 for the next period. Similarly, 
p -i + (1 ,--1 T-  - r i b  PB 1)PL, (12) 
is the payoff player A expects from pa r -  a = 1, and using (9), 
7~BT-lp T - 1 U ( Q  HL) -J- (1 - 7~ BT-lpB-T-1)(~[~TU(Q HL) -J- (1 - -  7~T)(~PL "] (13) 
from playing p r - 1  = 0. 
Claim 3. 3[nBrU(Q HE) + (1 -- nT)3pL] < PL" 
Proof Assume the contrary. 6 < 6c implies _0(8) < U(QnL), and from (12) and (13) 
T* the optimum strategy for A is par-a = 0. But since PA = 0 too, player B would 
be better-off setting p r -1  = 1 (participating in period T - 1) which contradicts 
Claim 1. Q.E.D. 
Given the result in Claim 3 and n r -  1 > ~(3) for i = A, B, there must exist 
numbers 0 < p [ - l *  < 1 such that 
T - l *  T-1  1 
PA ~A = 1 + [U(Q nL) - /~ (J ) ] / (1  - 3)PL 
and 
T-I*  T-1  1 
PB ~B = 1 + E U ( Q  "L) - - U ( Q  "L) + (1 - " 
The strategies above are determined respectively using (10), (11), (12) and 
(13), and are unique. Thus the respective payoffs of the players, discounted to 
T - 1 are given by WA r -1  = p r - l *  (12) + (1 -- p r - t* )  (13) and W r - 1  = p r - l *  
(10) + (1 - p~-  1.) (11). Clearly, pA r -  1, and p r -  1. are best replies to each other and 
beliefs are consistent with these strategies. We have thus far constructed the portion 
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of the PBE path for periods T and T - 1 under the assumption that the NC-game 
is reached at T with probability one. Given Wa r -  ~ and W~ r -  1, we can proceed to 
period T -  2 and determine the optimal (mixed) participation strategies, using 
Bayes' rule for updating beliefs as we did for period T - 1. Carrying this process 
inductively until period one should lead to the initial conditions described by 
~ > ~(6) and 6 < 6c. The portion of the overall game ending at date T can be 
viewed as a finite game if we exclude the contribution games in each period. Thus 
the number of equilibria of this game must be odd. Since the completely mixed 
participation strategies corresponding to the initial conditions described in the 
proposition are uniquely determined, and since no equilibrium in pure participa- 
tion strategies exists, this number must be equal to one. Q.E.D. 
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